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Fascinating it is to have Gil Anidjar, Mayanthi Fernando, Bruce Lawrence, and Nada
Moumtaz as readers who think with, and what may occasionally appear to some, against
the author. They do so, in different ways, descriptively as well as generatively. It is the
critical, generative dimension—not simply the reasonable (and unexpected, too) praise and
appreciation, which nonetheless help evaluate one’s intellectual labor—that ought to interest
an author. Or, so do I think. Thus, I begin by thanking them! To Yunus Dogan Telliel,
I thank for organizing this symposium.
Since their comments are significantly varied, rich, dense, and instituted from multiple
standpoints, disciplinary and thematic, here I am unable, due mainly to word limit, to
address them all. I take up select issues raised by each.
At the center of Anidjar’s reflections is the notion of time in Kant’s 1784 essay (Kant
2007) and the many responses to it. His contention is that not only did Kant pose the
question “What is Aufkl€arung” in the present tense, since then readers, including
Foucault, too have commented on it “in the grammatical present . . . and about the present
moment.” It is against this attitude of presentism, and I should add in resonance with my
own description of it (Ahmad 2017a, 32ff), that he asks, almost defiantly: “What Was
Enlightenment?” Although Foucault dwells on the then and now of the Enlightenment
thereby introducing history, unlike Kant, Anidjar reads him (Foucault) interested primarily
in “the difference that yesterday introduces with respect to today”(Anidjar 2019, 174, italics in
original). Drawing on Susan Buck-Morss’ work on Hegel, he finds the latter also preoccu-
pied with his present.1 Anidjar thus observes that if Kant designated his age as the age of the
Enlightenment, “Ahmad certainly dares to know . . . our present” and “ours is the age of
Islam as critique”(178).
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Wait! Am I interested in the present in the ways Kant, Hegel, and Foucault were? In his
exposition, Anidjar uses “now”, “the present” and “contemporary moment” as interchange-
able. Probably they are not. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, they respectively
mean: “at the present time or moment,” “the current moment, period, or age . . . opposed to
the past and the future,” and “belonging to the same time, age, or period . . .modern” (OED
Online 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). Is the present necessarily opposed to the past or the future,
however? Is this even possible? Relatedly, does the present, as usually construed, exist in the
first place? The Indian philosopher–statesman Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) doubted it.
In a letter written from the British prison in 1943, Azad (1996, 248–249) wrote about Abu
al-¤Ala' al-Ma¤arrı (d. 1058), an Arab poet–philosopher. Commenting on al-Ma¤arrı’s tri-
partite division of time (zamana) into yesterday, today, and tomorrow, he asked if the
present (h* al) indeed existed. To Azad, past (maz*ı) and future (mustaqbil) were two tempo-
ralities (zamano~n; sing. zamana) of which h* al was only an additional continuation (tasalsul).
True, in addition to the past and present, time also has a third feature—the present—but, he
mused, it arrives to pass so rapidly that seldom can we grasp it. In the very thought of
chasing the present, Azad continued, it changes its feature (no¤ıat) thereby leaving us only
with the past and the future.
The present Anidjar engages with is different. The times of Kant, Hegel and those writing
about them in and for the present fuse such to become a “history of the present.” How long
is this present? What texture does it possess? When did it begin? Did it begin in the fifth
century, when modern (in its Latin form) was deployed to “distinguish the present, which
had become officially Christian, from the Roman and pagan past” (Habermas and Ben-
Habib 1981, 3)? Or, did it emerge from the seventeenth century “onwards” in Europe to
spread across the world (Giddens 1990, 1)? The word “onwards” is striking in that moder-
nity as the present condition distinct from the past continues and, therefore, it cannot be of
yore. If the time from the seventeenth century until now constitutes the present, it is a
present quite unlike Azad’s. It is also a fairly long one, bordering on permanence (until
further notice, perhaps)!
Foucault’s preoccupation with the present indeed characterized his entire corpus. In an
interview (published only in 2014), he remarked that if there was a “certain coherence in
what I do”, it is because he addressed Kant’s “question ‘What is Enlightenment?’—that is to
say, ‘What is our current situation? What is happening around us . . .’?” (2014, 236). But as
Anidjar (2019, 178–179) deftly notes, Foucault did “historical research” and dealt with the
past, albeit unconventionally.
“What is Critique?” speaks of history frequently. It is indeed “the history of the critical
attitude” (Foucault 2007a, 43, 69)—a phrase uttered twice. Foucault’s history, pursued
through a “historical-philosophical” framework and at once indebted to and departing
from Kant,2 reads as follows: The critical attitude, unfolding in the modern West around
the sixteenth century, “must have its origin in the religious struggle . . . during the second half
of the Middle Age.” Acting pastorally, the Christian Church came to govern human life
comprehensively. Directed at salvation, life got hooked on obedience. Initially limited to
monasteries, with “a veritable explosion of the art of governing men”, from the fifteenth
century onwards, it also encompassed civil society. “Born in Europe” as a “specific attitude”
and in relation to the Scriptures, critique was a refusal to the “governmentalization of both
society and individuals” presided over by the “ecclesiastical rule.” Foucault the genealogist
even offered its definition: “the art of not being governed so much.” To exercise a critical
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attitude was thus to “insure the desubjugation of the subject.” Power, truth, and the subject
formed a relational triad at “the core of critique” (69, 58, 44–45, 47).
This was Foucault’s history guided by a set of questions. My questions are different.
Building on Talal Asad’s (1993, 2003) works, I am interested in what an anthropology of
critique might look like outside of Europe/Christianity. What does critique do in a tradition
that has nothing similar to the Church nor did it have/require the Aufkl€arung and where
relations among power, truth, and the subject—themselves historically situated—are obtained
differently? How is life intertwined with death connected to critique? Is it possible to envision
critique emerging from the Qur’an, not, a la Foucault, in opposition to the Scripture? Did not
critique prevail, or at least exist, before the explosion of the art of governing? These
comparative-anthropological questions took me, inter alia, to the axial age and Hijaz to
read the prophets’ mission as one that of enacting reform (Is: lah: ): to reform was to critique
and to critique was to reform. Notably, Foucault did not ask such questions. Throughout
concerned with Europe, he only compared Europe diagonally (Hallaq 2018, 15). Such were
the concerns and questions that led me to view critique as “transformative.” It was transfor-
mative also in the sense of enunciating another way of thinking predicated on beckoning a
different future, one that, pace Foucault (2007b, 114), is radical and liberated from the inev-
itable “return of the most dangerous traditions.” Anidjar’s suggestion that my notion of
critique as “transformative” speaks to “conversion” as espistrophe, metanoia, or Foucault’s
alternative to both is tempting. The temptation ought to be guarded, at least for now.
If Religion as Critique, as Anidjar (2019, 173) describes it, is a “provocative intervention,”
one key element of it is to enunciate a tradition, thinking, and history (with due qualifica-
tions) of critique other than the one Foucault insightfully offers.
Important to this intervention are accounts of prophets from Adam, Noah, Abraham,
Moses, Jesus, up to Muhammad as well as ¤ulema. I discuss the dream in the form of a
debate (bah* as_) Shah Valiullah had in the precinct of Ka¤ba in the early eighteenth century.
Fernando’s remark that my intervention, as also Asad’s, “parallels” nineteenth century Sri
Lanka’s Buddhist monks’ response in a debate with Christian missionaries on terms set by
the latter, therefore, seems close to puzzling. It is one thing to say that my intervention—like
any other, not excluding her own—is informed by “the asymmetric geopolitics of the con-
temporary moment,” (Fernando 2019, 182) quite another to imprison it within the four
walls of that contemporaneity. The book’s theses, let me stress, are instituted with careful
attention to the asymmetrical world (dis)order.
Even more puzzling is the style in which Fernando (2019, 183) frames her commentary in
which there are no more than two parties: Europeans set the question and non-Europeans
feel “obliged to respond”. Are not many questions already answers and, therefore, they beg
further questions in the same way as many answers are and can be questions? Moreover,
rather than assuming a prior category of “European,” did not it emerge, in part, out of this
very debate and interaction (van der Veer 2001)? To remain with Fernando’s question–
response model, an interesting point, however, is how one reflects on that geopolitics. An
influential and standard stance—for example, Edward Said’s—has been to respond by loy-
ally remaining within the universe of the discourse. Said’s ideal was the Enlightenment and
its secular humanism (Hallaq 2018). As is well known, he called himself a secular critic. He is
even credited with coining “secular criticism” (Gourgouris 2013, xv). Lamenting that the
contemporary critics had become “cleric,” Said invoked the Enlightenment for critique to
“become a truly secular enterprise” (1983, 292).3 Religion as Critique presupposes no such
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ideal. Nor does it theorize critique in terms of clerical-secular polarity. Rather, it undoes
that very polarity.
Without discussing the premise of an absolute, pure outside that undergirds her com-
ment, I turn to the subject of cultural translation Fernando productively raises about my
book. She seems uncomfortable with my position, which is “neither one of radical incom-
mensurability between Islamic and Western notions of critique, nor of absolute isomor-
phism between the two. Instead I favor a robust dialogue and comparison” (Ahmad cited in
Fernando 2019, 184). Based on her interpretation of Asad, she takes translation as scandal
only. She finds aspects of my book “that cause the kind of scandal Asad advocates, includ-
ing the argument that the Enlightenment was an ‘ethnic project’” (Fernando 2019, 185).
Likewise, she applauds my refusal to translate ¤ulema as clerics. The non-scandalous, in her
reading, is my assumption of critique as a universal “master category” for I “consistently
translat[e] . . . tanqıd and naqd as critique.”4 In doing so, thus runs her assumption, I am
insufficiently attentive to incommensurability and untranslatability.
Asad undoubtedly is right that translation occurs across unequal languages. However, I do
not think Asad implies that every translation must be scandalous. If it were only scandalous,
Asad would not find merits in the translational works of Rachid Ghanushi (Mahmood 1996).
Scandalous and non-scandalous at times may co-travel. One should thus gainfully speak of
the nature, degree, specificity, and purpose of both incommensurability and untranslatability,
which Fernando construes as defiance against the Western academy.
Western academics, especially in the securityscape,5 and media often do not translate
jihad. Likewise, the media does not translate Allah-o-Akbar which was/is supposedly
uttered when a Muslim indulges in shooting (when non-Muslim shooters kill, they do not
utter anything, certainly no religious words). It is unclear to me how such acts of untrans-
latability and incommensurability secure liberation—a goal that is Fernando’s, others’, and
mine too. If they do, whose liberation is it? Is it liberation in the first place?6
Part of Fernando’s commentary emanates from another misunderstanding as she inter-
prets me as responding to the question: “are Muslims capable of critique?” Anticipating a
possible misinterpretation of my main concern in the book, I indeed included the following
remark in the preface: “Beyond perfunctory apologia such as ‘Muslims also have a tradition
of critique like the West has’, it argues for the specificity of Islam and the need for a genuine
democratic dialogue with different traditions”(Ahmad 2017, xii). With the comparative goal
of my inquiry, which she notes, as well as the genealogical approach for which I draw on
Nietzsche and Foucault through Asad, her premise about universalism is unsustainable. If
anything, Foucault (2008, 3) distrusted universals, due, among others, to his concerns with
“concrete practices.” From this perspective, I am unsure if Dipesh Chakrabarty, as
Fernando suggests, would be helpful for the enterprise that Religion as Critique is.
InHabitations of Modernity, Chakrabarty dwells on how to relate to difference, especially
about India’s partition that resulted in mass violence. Treating the political and ethical as
separate, he aims to find an “ethical space.” To this end, Chakrabarty distinguishes between
identity and proximity. While identity is “a mode of relating . . . in which difference is
either . . . frozen, fixed, or it is erased by some claim of being identical or the same,” prox-
imity is an obverse mode in which difference “is neither reified nor erased but negotiated”
(2002, 140). Chakrabarty recounts the 1991 trip he and his parents made to Bangladesh
where his father was born and raised but which he left after the partition in 1947. The
Muslim family that his father had employed (as servants?) now lived in his house. Its oldest
male member recognized Chakrabarty’s father. Sensing that he had come to reclaim his
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property, there was deep tension, especially among members younger than the old man who
said: “you can take it back, if you want.” After this quote, Chakrabarty writes:
That was the field of the political coming into our conversations. Once we assured them, how-
ever, that we had come simply to see the house, that I lived outside India and had no practical
interest in acquiring property in Bangladesh, they relaxed. And then a space opened-up for what
I have called the practice of proximity . . .. (147, italics in original)
Religion as Critique contests this style of finding “ethical space” for it amounts to tutoring
the subalternated (not subaltern) Bangladeshi Muslim family into ethics as if it did not have
any ethics or notion of proximity of its own until introduced by Chakrabarty. Instead, my
book takes Muslims as thinking and ethical subjects in their own right. It is worth noting, en
passant, that subaltern studies of which Chakrabarty was/is a prominent advocate, claimed
to question the tutorial impulse of the liberal-elite historiography.
Unlike Chakrabarty who, in his exchange with the Muslim family, does not tell readers
the words used in Bangla, Moumtaz’s comments are precisely of that nature. To better
capture the aim of the book, which “pulls the rug under very common presumptions
about Islam,” (Moumtaz 2019, 194) she suggests using debate, not critique, because the
latter seems to be a modern reformulation of Islamic tradition in conversation with
the Enlightenment tradition. In her view, debate brings less of the Enlightenment under-
standings that come with critique. Cognizant of my limitation in Arabic, particularly of the
treatise Moumtaz introduces, I address her perceptive question preliminarily. As she reads
it, Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) Naqd Maratib al-Ijma¤ uses (naqd) in the title but its aim is
far from accomplishing critique as understood in English. In it, he cites passages he dis-
agrees with from Ibn H: azm’s Degrees of Consensus and rebuts them. That is, rather than
“subjecting the terms of the debate to critique (for instance, rejecting the notion of con-
sensus),” (Moumtaz 2019, 196), Ibn Taymiyya accepts Ibn Hazm’s premises to show his
disagreement only about some claims. So, naqd, as used by Ibn Taymiyya, Moumtaz sug-
gests, does not have the sense of an all-round disagreement with or a systematic criticism of
a viewpoint, especially of an opponent, for which, the Arabic words are (naq :d) and radd
(refutation). Al-Mawrid Arabic-English Dictionary (1995) glosses naq :d as nullification,
quashing, reversal, and so on.
I have more to say about Ibn Taymiyya below. Let me note here the benefits of retaining
critique in place of debate. To begin with, debate, as in the Sri Lankan case Fernando
discusses, usually assumes two rival parties. Its aim is also dualistic: victory or defeat; or
at least, a scoring of points. Verily, its participants tend to find faults in the opponents’
stance or position. Objections, claims, and counter claims, even accusations, may surround a
debate. Critique transcends such practices to say and show not only why and how a position
is problematic but also to lay bare the larger assumptions the position stems from. In so
doing, critique—a thorough and good one—also draws an alternative portrait. It describes
not only why a thing is, how it is, but also how it could be other than what it is. Marx, unlike
Weber, was interested not in some aspects of capitalism, which he critiqued by demonstrat-
ing how it has come about and the core elements that constitute it. His interest instead was
in capitalist economy as a social form in its entirety. He also outlined an alternative
to capitalism.
Anjum (2012, 206 n.22, 277, 177) and Hallaq (1993, 187–188, li, xlviii), two specialists on
this subject, give precisely such a notion of critique at work in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings in the
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titles of which appear naqd, naq :d, and radd. Neither Anjum nor Hallaq, however, discuss these
terms and their linguistically–historically evolved usage, let alone the ways they differ from
one another. Yet, both regularly describe Ibn Taymiyya’s works as work of critique. Hallaq
(1993, xxxiii, xxxix) even calls Ibn Taymiyya a “critic” and discusses “sources of the critique.”
To Anjum (2012, 177), his was “a total critique,” “starting with its intellectual apparatus and
social and political institutions.” Importantly, while introducing Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd ‘ala
al-Mantiqiyyın, Hallaq views his intervention as critique rather than refutation. He does dis-
cuss instances of refutation by Ibn Taymiyya but rightly views them not as a goal in itself but
an aid to achieving something else, which is critique. Insofar as I view critique as different
from debate and refutation/rebuttal, and this is what it ought to be, it is worth quoting Hallaq
(1993, xlviii): “Ibn Taymiyya’s genius does not lie in the particular arguments he addu-
ced. . .rather, his genius manifests itself in creating from the material that consisted of these
particular arguments, a complete, systematic, and coherent critique.” Himself a Sufi, Ibn
Taymiyya did not simply object to the dominant doctrine of vah* dat al-vajud (a topic discussed
in my Prologue); he went into its conceptual, logical, and philosophical postulates (and its
implications) to show its weakness and offered a full-scale rationale thereof.7
I wanted to respond to Moumtaz’s pertinent question about critique and its relations
with orthodoxy. But space allows me only to say a word or two about Lawrence’s obser-
vations composed in lyrical prose. In particular, he notes my anthropological–historical
exposition on critique in everyday life by ordinary subjects such as those of K* hudaı
K* hidmatgar, a movement launched by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, as “nothing short of
revisionism at its most extreme, and daring, pinnacle” and its analysis as “imaginative”
(Lawrence 2019, XX). Like Ian Almond (2018), he compares Religion as Critique with
Shahab Ahmed’s What is Islam? He identifies adab in “its fullest meaning” as the shared
ground between the two. There could be more commonalities. My immediate thought about
What is Islam?—a rare recent book embodying the best of the classical scholarship and the
length of which matches Hegel’s Philosophy of History—was to appreciate its theoretical
ambition as well as note some fundamental differences. In ways more than one, wine is one
of its important subjects. Rather than examine how it emerged historically–culturally to
become pervasive and how people perform it, Ahmed took the desire for wine as a universal
given. Notably, he also split the Islamic tradition to posit philosophical–Sufi amalgam in
contradiction to sharia Islam. This binary was mapped temporally, linguistically, as well as
spatially: Arab (Arabic) versus Balkan-to-Bengal (mainly Farsi). I disagree with both.
Since Ahmed’s book entails a separate discussion, I want to conclude with Lawrence’s
description of Ahmed and me as “Muslim scholars.” It is no secret that many anthropol-
ogists were devout Christians: Mary Douglas, Evans-Pritchard, Margaret Mead, and Victor
Turner, to mention only some (Larson 2014). None is described as a Christian scholar in the
same way as M. N. Srinivas and G. S. Ghurye (the “father” of Indian sociology) are not
called Hindu sociologists, whereas the pre-fix “Muslim” is added in names like Irfan Ahmad
or similar sounding names—Ansari, Fatima, Hasan, Mohammad and the like. Are presence
and absence of such prefixes part of the project of world-(un)making connected to secular–
religious dualism, Western reason, and the Enlightenment?
I raise this question in the sense of adab (as politeness/etiquette), and which Lawrence so
beautifully captures. In that spirit, let me say, adab ¤arz* (greetings) to my interlocutors and
readers alike! Let us greet naqd/tanqıd so as to examine the regnant doxa of the
Enlightenment as critique.
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1. If so, was Islam part of Hegel’s present? He held that “Islam has long vanished from the stage of
history at large. . .” (1914, 374). Curiously, as a discipline, anthropology—whose practitioner I
am—was/is committed to the past, to study “the primitive” before and outside the modern/present.
2. The essay concludes how critique is bound up with “What is the Aufkl€arung”—a phrase that could
have been the “title of my conference” (Foucault 2007a, 67).
3. The introduction and conclusion to Said’s book were titled, respectively, as “Secular Criticism” and
“Religious Criticism.”
4. If the passage where critique followed by tanqıd/naqd in brackets gives such an impression, let me
cite it.
Without fully accounting for this constellation alluded to above, we cannot adequately
understand even the widely agreed common minimum notion of critique (tanqıd/naqd) in
South Asian Urdu/Islamic tradition—to assess (ja~nchna/parakhna) or to distinguish between
original and fake, good and bad or not so good. (xiv)
There I mean to stress the book’s comparative pursuit. Importantly, I do not use the
word “translate.”
5. This term is Hugh Gusterson’s coinage and follows Arjun Appadurai’s description of various
scapes in Modernity at Large; see Albro et al. (2012, 11, 13n2).
6. In 2017, Junaid, an Indian hafiz was publicly lynched on account of being a Muslim. When Junaid’s
uneducated mother, Saira, heard about his murder, unlike political pundits, she did not say that
populism or intolerance had killed him. She mostly cried. “Can democracy, then, understand the tears
and moaning through which Saira spoke?” (Ahmad 2017b). Such questions seem more radical than
Houria Bouteldja’s who Fernando cites. In the very act of refusing to answer, “can Muslim women be
feminists,” Bouteldja nonetheless makes feminism the pivot of her refusal to restage its centrality.
7. To Fernando’s point that I do not distinguish among tanqıd, naqd, and intiqad. Chapter 3 spells out
that while naqd is exclusively used in Arabic and intiqad in Farsi, in Urdu all three words are used,
tanqıd being the most prevalent one.
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